We examine, in a vertical industry, the strategic role of horizontal subcontracting through option contracts by a downstream dominant firm competing with a competitive fringe. Downstream production requires an input from an upstream component-producing industry composed of imperfectly competitive suppliers.
Introduction
An option contract is an arrangement whereby one of the involved parties, in exchange of a payment, has the right but not the obligation to buy or sell a specified item at a specified price (the strike or exercise price) up to a specified date. A forward contract may be viewed as equivalent to an option contract which is always exercised because the strike price is set at a sufficiently low level that makes its execution always profitable.
The potential strategic effects of forward contracts on the performance of spot markets have been largely explored by the literature on industrial organization. From the seminal work of Allaz and Vila (1993) examining this question in a vertically integrated industry, a number of papers have addressed the issue in relation with outsourcing of production among firms competing in the same market, which may be referred as horizontal subcontracting (Kamien et al., 1989; Spiegel, 1993; Shy and Stenbacka, 2003) . In this line, Antelo and Bru (2002) showed that subcontracting downstream production through forward contracts has an anticompetitive effect on spot prices in a vertical industry, in sharp contrast with Allaz and Vila's finding concerning forwards in a vertically integrated industry.
Options contracts are a more sophisticated contracting form than forward contracts and perhaps more realistic too. A stylized fact in real-world industries is that a number of business relationships and contractual arrangements among firms feature characteristics of an option contract. To illustrate, quantity-flexibility contracts in the electronics industry (Barnes-Schuster et al., 2002) , backup agreements in the catalog companies and manufacturers industry (Eppen and Iyer, 1997) , or allotment contracts and free sale contracts to book hotel accommodation in the travel industry (Castellani and Mussoni, 2005) can be understood as option contracts.
The operations research literature (Zhao et al, ; Hammond, 1992; Burnetas and Ritchken, 2005; Wang and Liu, 2007) does not place the rationale of these option contracts on their potential strategic role. The light is placed on the need to manage the risk of inventories associated with uncertain demand, which leads firms to use contracts that provide flexibility and "coordinate" decisions between various links in the retailer-manufacturer supply chain when there is aversion to incurring inventory costs. Indeed, a number of supply-chain models identify the optimal actions for firms and, due to the lack of an incentive to implement those actions, how firms can adjust their terms of trade via a contract that establishes a transfer payment scheme to create that incentive (Cachon, 2001) .
Given that neither the supply-chain management literature nor the research on forward markets consider the potential strategic role played by option contract, our primary goal in this paper is to fill this gap by extending the analysis on the strategic role of forward markets to option contracts. 1 In particular, we want to examine the strategic effects of option contracts in a framework in which a dominant firm competing with a fringe of price-taking firms have to acquire an essential input from imperfectly competitive upstream suppliers to produce a final good. Our objective is to investigate how subcontracting production by the dominant firm to the competitive fringe through option contracts and forward contracts may facilitate the acquisition of inputs at more favorable marginal prices. Put differently, how these contracts regarding subcontracting downstream production to the fringe has a potential to gain strategic benefits in the upstream market. This is because these contracts strengthen the bargaining position of the contractor firm in dealing with the supplier, by creating a more valuable alternative in case of a breakdown in negotiations.
Our research adds to the literature four important findings. First, when subcontracting of downstream production takes the form of option contracts, the dominant firm outsources production to the fringe. 2 Hence, it can strategically use option contracts to subcontract with the fringe as a means to increase the clout in negotiating the acquisition of the input with upstream suppliers by reinforcing its market power in the downstream market. Second, although both option contracts and forward contracts facilitate better deals with input suppliers, option contracts are more profitable than forward contracts for the dominant firm. As a consequence, it 1 Contract theory has also analyzed a different role for option contracts; namely, its usefulness to alleviate moral hazard problems in trades when contracts are incomplete and specific investments are needed, in which case efficiency may be achieved with an option contract (Noldeke and Schmidt, 1995; Segal and Whinston, 2002) . But both the operations research literature and that on industrial organization show the use of these contracts with no specific investment whatsoever. 2 Antelo and Bru (2002) found a similar result when subcontracts are binding forward contracts for fixed quantities. They also analyzed the balance between vertical and horizontal effects when the downstream segment consists of an oligarchic dominant group together with a price-taking fringe.
will prefer to use option contracts to outsource downstream production, whenever feasible, instead of forward contracts. Third, if the market demand of final good is certain, option contracts do not lead to price manipulation in the downstream market beyond that caused by market power. Thus, unlike forward contracts, option contracts are innocuous for consumers.
Fourth, when demand is variable and subject to uncertainty, option contracts may increase volatility on spot prices and, as a result, the price of final good may increase.
The dominant firm may gain leverage against upstream suppliers by subcontracting downstream production to its rivals either through forward contracts or through option contracts (not necessarily exercised). Although both types of contracts do not seem very different, their strategic effects in the contractor's behaviour and the performance in the spot market are quite different, at least when the demand of final good is not subject to uncertainty. Regarding forward contracts, they are strategically equivalent to a consolidation process of the dominant firm that unfolds through purchasing productive capacity and lead it to achieve stronger market power downstream. This is because the dominant firm only gains leverage against input suppliers if it actually purchases production from fringe firms. The effect of the stronger market power by dominant firm is then an increase in the price of final good.
Contrariwise, when the dominant firm is not restricted to outsource production through forward contracts only, but may also resort to option contracts, it stops manipulating the spot price and uses option contracts with the sole purpose of increasing its bargaining power in the input market. Hence, a dominant firm with idle capacity may even subcontract production to the fringe, but this will be made through option contracts that are sometimes not exercised. Option contracts, although likewise anti-competitive, do not increase the price of final good (at least in the absence of demand uncertainty), because the dominant firm only needs to sign option contracts, i.e. to threaten to buy some downstream production from the fringe, to facilitate better deals in the input market. Indeed, it turns out that options are preferable to forwards not only for the dominant firm, but also for final consumers, although fringe firms would prefer forward contracts.
That option contracts do not lead to downstream market distortions beyond those caused by unavoidable market power whenever there is no uncertainty in demand of final good is due to the fact that they are signed featuring a strike price such that in equilibrium the contracts are never exercised. Thus, they only lead to a redistribution of rents from the crucial upstream supplier to the dominant downstream firm.
However, under demand uncertainty, the optimal option contracts regarding subcontracting production to the fringe feature a such an equilibrium strike price that they are exercised when the demand realization is high. Although option contracts could be designed featuring a such strike price that they are never executed, usually this is not the optimal option contract. Thus, option contracts lead to stronger market power in the downstream side, which in turn causes market distortions in the form of a more volatile price for final good and reduced expected consumer surplus.
That forward and option contracts are both anti-competitive in a vertical industry sharply contrasts with Allaz and Vila (1993) 's finding concerning forward contracting in a vertically integrated industry. 3 What we show in this paper is, firstly, that option contracts are more profitable than forward contracts and, as a consequence, they will be preferred whenever they are feasible. Secondly, option contracts have similar anti-competitive consequences to the ones proved for forward contracts in Antelo and Bru (2002) . In particular, the conclusion that option contracts in a vertically industry do not lead to price distortion may not hold under market uncertainty. As a result, option contracts are better than forward contracts for both the dominant firm and consumers. To assure fringe's production, the dominant firm pays less for the outsourced production through option contracts than through forward contracts because only the latter lead to an increase in equilibrium price. Thus, the dominant firm subcontracts more production when option contracts are available, and this allows it to increase its bargaining power in the upstream market. In addition, even if the dominant firm does not execute the option contracts in equilibrium, this does not worry consumers, because is merely a struggle between the dominant firm and upstream supplier. Finally, fringe firms would prefer forward contracts to option contracts.
Summing up, our analysis of option contracts extends that of forwards in the sense that the strategic vertical effect implied by both contracts is clearer for options than for forwards.
The dominant firm manipulates the price of final good when it is restricted to use forward contracts, but if option contracts are feasible, the strategic effect stops increasing such a price and instead increases bargaining power in the upstream market. Option contracts then do not introduce additional distortions to those caused by a market power firm since they are used to increase its leverage against suppliers, which do not lead to additional price distortions in the price of final good. Hence, if a vertical industry can use option contracts allowing the internalization of profits, the vertical structure leads to distortions in the price of final good, even when double marginalization is not an issue, 4 and such distortions ought to be compared with the risk of vertical foreclosure from a vertically integrated structure.
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The finding whereby manipulation in the price of final good would not be observed when the dominant firm uses option contracts may not hold under demand uncertainty. In this case, option contracts lead to greater price volatility and, as a result, higher prices for consumers. The dominant firm wishes to increase its bargaining power in the upstream market, but it does not have an incentive to increase the price of final good, since such an increase is passed on to fringe firms as more expensive option contracts. The increase in the downstream market price is a by-product of the fact that option contracts are not contingent on the state of demand.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. In Section 3
we examine the use of forward contracts and option contracts in a vertically integrated industry, where these contracts cannot be used for vertical strategic purposes. The effects of such contracts on the dominant firm's behaviour, the (rational-expectations equilibrium) price of contracts and the market performance in general is investigated. Section 4 examines the strategic use of these contracts in a vertical industry showing that a dominant firm may subcontract downstream production to the fringe not for horizontal motives but for vertical reasons; namely, to gain leverage in the input market. Despite having idle capacity, the dominant firm may subcontract production through option contracts that it may not even exercise. This section also shows that option contracts are innocuous for final consumers.
Section 5 is devoted to uncertainty in demand of final good and shows that in this case the use of options may increase price volatility in such market. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
The model
We consider an industry in which a dominant firm and a fringe of small firms all produce a homogeneous final good. In Section 3 the industry is viewed as a vertically integrated industry with all firms having identical marginal (and average) costs. Thereafter, it adopts a vertical shape, being the dominant firm and the fringe the downstream side, both producing a final good for which an essential input (intermediate good) is needed. The input is purchased to an upstream supplier at marginal and average cost c, c>0.
In this framework, the dominant firm may subcontract downstream production to the fringe firms through option contracts (where options may not be exercised) or through binding forward contracts. In order to concentrate on the vertical strategic role of such contracts, we first assume, in Sections 3 and 4, that downstream demand is certain and unchanging. Later, in Section 5, we consider that demand is subject to uncertainty, in which case all firms are assumed to be risk-neutral.
In what follows, the cost to the dominant firm and the fringe of acquiring the intermediate good will be denoted by c D and c F , respectively. The strike price of option contracts and the delivery price of forward contracts is referred as p s , 6 whereas the number of contracts signed is X, and the number of option contracts exercised is x (for forward contracts, if follows that X x = ). The dominant firm's production when it executes x option contracts is ) , ( c x q , and the productive capacity of the competitive fringe as a whole is m. Finally, the inverse demand function for final good is given by
We assume that
, so the fringe always produce at full capacity m, whereby
, where p is the expected spot price. Clearly, in a rational expectations equilibrium, a fringe firm expects the spot price to
, whereas the spot price for a dominant firm is endogenously determined and depends on its own level of production )
Note that an option contract to subcontract the amount of production x i with a fringe firm i is equivalent to set a non-linear tariff
, where production acquired by the dominant firm must satisfy i i X x ≤ , the fixed fee of the tariff must be
, and the linear part must be
On the other hand, we will see below that, for sufficiently low levels of the strike price, the dominant firm exercises all the option contracts signed, in which case option contracts are equivalent to signing X forward contracts with price
stands for forward price) and to signing X i forward contracts with any fringe firm i for a fixed
Subcontracting production through option contracts
What, in a vertically integrated industry, are the incentives of a dominant firm to outsource production to the fringe firms either through a futures market or through an options market? Ex-post, a dominant firm may manipulate the price of final good by signing option contracts, but ex-ante it has no incentive to sign them, at least not at a strictly positive price. It will only then sign innocuous option contracts with price 0 = c p that are not subsequently executed and hence that do not affect its market behaviour and profits.
Let us first assume that the dominant firm signs, with the fringe, X ∈ [0,m] option contracts at strike price p s , and that it exercises x of them later on. In these circumstances, its profits amount to
and are composed of two terms: the first added is the profit derived from internal production, whereas the second one is the profit due to the execution of a certain volume of option contracts.
It also can be noted from (1) that the dominant firm finds it profitable to exercise x, 0 > x , option contracts if, and only if, the resulting market price is above the strike price,
It is illustrative to solve the problem stated in (1) by proceeding in two stages. We first determine the optimal level of internal production for the dominant firm, q(x,c), given the number of executed option contracts, x, and then we determine the optimal number of option contracts executed. For a given level x of executed option contracts, the internal production of
, is that which satisfies the first-order condition
Differentiating (2) with respect to x shows that
by virtue of the assumptions made on demand. It then follows that: a)
, the profit given in (1), is a convex function of x and, therefore,
we can obtain the following result by comparing profits in both corner solutions.
Lemma 1. If the dominant firm signs X option contracts with the fringe, then all of them are exercised (x=X) whenever the strike price satisfies
, whereas no one is exercised
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 establishes that only option contracts that feature a strike price ) , ( c X h p s < will be executed by the dominant firm. Note that, accordingly, an option contract featuring a strike
is strategically equivalent to a forward contract. 
and the following result holds. Proof. See the Appendix.
In a rational expectations equilibrium, the dominant firm has no incentive to manipulate the price of final good by subcontracting production through option contracts that are exercised in equilibrium. Since fringe firms ask for a total price s c p p + at least equal to the expected spot price ) (Q P , then if the dominant firm subcontracts production to the fringe, its incentive to manipulate spot prices increases, but any additional rent of the industry thanks to any price increase is passed from the dominant firm to the fringe in a rational expectations equilibrium.
Therefore, one cannot expect the dominant firm to sign option contracts in a vertically integrated industry.
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In the next section, we will examine how the strategic behaviour of the dominant firm in subcontracting (downstream) production to fringe firms is affected when they all form the downstream segment of a vertical industry and deal with imperfectly competitive upstream suppliers of an essential input.
Horizontal subcontracting in a vertical industry
We now consider a vertical industry with upstream suppliers of an input (intermediate good) 10 For the sake of simplicity, the input is transformed with no additional production costs into the final good on a one-to-one basis by downstream firms.
Furthermore, we assume that the lowest conceivable spot price,
, which guarantees positive profits to fringe firms and, therefore, implies that all their production capacity m will be always in use.
The efficient supplier can charge the dominant firm a two-part tariff wq F q T + = ) ( for the input. To simplify, we assume that the supplier can make a take-it-or-leave-offer, where the alternative for the dominant firm is to produce at marginal cost c , i.e. the cost of acquiring the input to the alternative source of less efficient suppliers.
To this quite standard model of vertical relations, we add the possibility that the dominant firm subcontracts downstream production to the fringe through publicly observable option contracts. The timing of the game is as follows. First, the dominant firm subcontracts production to fringe firms through option contracts. Second, the upstream efficient supplier offers an input contract to the dominant firm. Third, the dominant firm decides whether to accept this proposal.
Fourth, the dominant firm decides the number of options it exercises on the production of the fringe (if any). Finally, the dominant firm sets its own production level. This timing is at reflecting the fact that subcontracting downstream production to the fringe is the longest-term action in the process. 11 As usual, we look for a subgame perfect equilibrium.
If there has been an agreement with the input supplier in the third stage of the game, the dominant firm produces ) , ( w  x, where x denotes its decision whether to execute its option contracts (in the equilibrium), with X x ≤ ≤ 0 . In equilibrium, the dominant firm accepts the input contract and has profits
where . In this case, its profits amount to
where
Since the input supplier has all the bargaining power, it can charge the largest fixed fee that
, and has profits
It is immediate that the input supplier maximizes profits when setting an input contract with a wholesale price c w = and a fixed-fee payment
Hence, in equilibrium the dominant firm will obtain the profit
We can now analyse the subcontracting decision of the dominant firm in the first stage of the game. First note that
, ( and 
is an increasing function in c.
that option contracts will not be exercised, they will accept to sign them at any slightly nonnegative price ε = c p , and the dominant firm has profits , and the dominant firm has profits
From the analysis of dominant firm's profits given in (11)-(13), the following result holds. Proof. See the Appendix.
The dominant firm could subcontract downstream production to fringe firms by signing option contracts that are exercised in equilibrium (and are thus equivalent to forward contracts); the derivative of profits given in (11) with respect to X is
which is strictly positive when evaluated at X=0,
However, the dominant firm obtain larger profits with option contracts that are not executed in equilibrium, because the "call price plus the strike price" of an option contract is below the price to be paid with a forward contract.
That price of forward contracts is larger is due to the dominant firm is committed to buy downstream production to the fringe in all circumstances, both in equilibrium (i.e. when an agreement with the upstream supplier is reached) and off-the-equilibrium path (i.e. in the case of a breakdown in negotiations with the input supplier). As a consequence, forward contracts lead to an increase in the price of final good that are reflected in the forward price,
, which is larger than prices when contracts are not exercised,
It is worth noting that, since in equilibrium the dominant firm does not introduce any further price manipulation in the spot market beyond that deriving from exerting its market power in the downstream market, the only impact of the option contracts is a redistribution of rents from the input supplier to the downstream dominant firm. Subcontracting downstream production through option contracts is then innocuous both for consumers and the fringe when there is no market uncertainty. Subcontracting through a forward market is, in contrast, anticompetitive, since it leads the dominant firm to reduce its production in equilibrium, which increases the price of final good. This is a quite interesting result to the point that one could say that a social planner worried about consumer surplus should promote the use of option contracts. But, does this result survive in a market uncertainty context? We will see in the next Section that the absence of anticompetitive effects of option prices may not persist if the demand of final good is subject to uncertainty.
Note that our result does not depend on the assumption that the upstream supplier offers take-it-or-leave-it input contracts to the dominant firm. If for instance it is the dominant firm who propose contracts with probability β ,
and it can be shown that the optimal option contract (and the quantity of contracts) remains the same; hence, in equilibrium, the dominant firm still does not acquire any downstream production from fringe firms. 
Option contracts when there is demand uncertainty
In Section 4 we obtain the striking result that, in equilibrium, option contracts are not exercised and, as a consequence, their signing do not affect final prices. In this section we deal with the impact of option contracts when there is demand uncertainty. We see that option contracts are sometimes exercised in equilibrium when demand is high, and as a consequence final prices are affected by the existence of such contracts. 14 We moreover restrict ourselves to parameter values for which (i) the price of the final good is always above c , and (ii) the dominant firm always produces internally.
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The full game develops now as follows. First, under demand uncertainty, the dominant firm subcontracts downstream production by signing X option contracts with fringe firms,
. Second, the dominant firm deals with the efficient input supplier. Third, the dominant firm decides whether to accept the supplier's proposal. In case of disagreement, the dominant firm is restricted to use the alternative source of inputs. Fourth, demand uncertainty is 14 This is indeed the case, for instance, for a linear demand as
and for a constantelasticity demand as
15 For a linear demand, this amounts to assume parameter values that satisfy
16 Fifth, the dominant firm decides how many option contracts to exercise. Finally, it decides its level of internal production. As usual, we look for a subgame perfect equilibrium.
We may readily characterize the dominant firm's behaviour regarding the existence of demand uncertainty. Now (4) depends on the particular realization of demand, 16 A change in the order of stages 2 and 4, i.e. that demand is known when negotiation of input contracts takes place, does not affect the choices of the dominant firm (the number of option contracts signed and exercised and the level of production). Of course it would affect the dominant firm's payment to the input supplier that would depend on the realization of demand, but the overall expected payment would remain the same. 
In this interval of values of the strike price s p , Figure 1 shows the distinct possibilities that we must consider. First at all, we may have either . In these regions, the price of the option contract must compensate fringe firms for the expected revenues in the market: Expected revenues for those fringe firms that sign an option contract are
18 With linear demand, we have
whereas those for fringe firms that sell directly in the market are
Thus the option contract must compensate for the market revenues that are resigned in high demand states,
If the dominant firm were to choose option contracts featuring a strike price in Regions C or D, then the result in Proposition 1 would no longer extend to arguably more realistic situations in which there is demand uncertainty. Before considering this possibility, we can state the following result.
Lemma 3. The optimal contract in Regions A and B has a strike price
Proof. See Appendix.
According to this lemma, the optimal option contract along those that are never exercised in equilibrium is the one with the lowest strike price. The dominant firm has a positive margin on these contracts off the equilibrium path, and therefore it makes sense to increase the number of demand states in which the option contracts are exercised.
However, we are mostly interested in the possibility that the dominant firm chooses strike prices in regions C and D. In both regions, option contracts are exercised more frequently off the equilibrium path, eq off θ θ < and moreover final prices are always higher off the
. Therefore, there is a potential to increase expected profits if strike prices are set below ) , , (
However, the dominant firm must also consider that fringe firm will ask for a strictly positive option contract according to (19) that compensates for losses in market revenues. In other words, the dominant firm must trade off savings on payments to fringe firms (an increase of s p reduces the demand states where option contracts are exercised in equilibrium) against lower bargaining power in the input market (an increase of s p reduces the demand states where option contracts are exercised off the equilibrium path).
In Region C, the dominant firm expected profits are . In region D, in off-the-equilibrium path the dominant firm always exercises the options and its expected profits are
In both regions, C and D, the dominant firm exercises the option contract in equilibrium in high demand states and therefore must pay the option contract in (19),
. The price c p of the option contracts must compensate the fringe firms for the profits they would expect in high demand states.
In Region C, the expected profits of the dominant firm evolve with the strike price as
and in Region D as
Both derivatives (22) and (23) 
A linear demand example
In what follows, we explicitly calculate the optimal number of option contracts to be signed by considering a linear demand schedule and the optimal number of option contracts are obtained in two steps. First, we determine the optimal contract as a function of the level of contracts, and then we find the optimal level of contracts. When the optimal contract is chosen, it is done in terms of the strike price; the premium c p -stated in terms of the strike price and the number of contracts -is the lowest premium the dominant firm must pay to fringe firms for these to accept the required number of contracts (and assuming fringe firms correctly evaluate their expected profits, i.e., assuming a rational expectations equilibrium in the contracting stage).
The dominant firm produces ) ( 2 
and Proof. See Appendix.
According to Lemma 4, we can be sure that for some parameter values, the dominant firm will choose a number of option contracts X such that they will be exercised in equilibrium when demand is high. In addition, we can evaluate in the case where )} ( 2 ), ( 2 min{ It is instructive to compare market performance under forward and option contracts. If forward contracts are used, the dominant firm profitably acquires production from fringe firms.
19 For a number of forward contracts X f , the forward price is
, where EP denotes expected price, and expected profits are
With a linear demand and uniform distribution on the parameter value, expected profits stated in 
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have investigated the strategic role played by option contracts and forward contracts regarding outsourcing of production in a vertical industry, where the downstream industry consists of a dominant firm together with a competitive fringe of small firms.
Downstream production requires an input from a component-producing industry with a supercompetitive supplier as well as second supply source. In this context, it is shown that, without uncertainty in the demand of the final good, the dominant firm subcontracts downstream production to the fringe firms through forward contracts in order to increase final prices to m θ θ − consumers (strategic horizontal effect). However, when it can use option contracts regarding subcontracting to the fringe firms these contracts are strategically used to increase the firm's leverage in the input market (strategic vertical effect) as preferable to increasing the price of the final good. Thus, the dominant firm stops manipulating prices in the downstream market when it can sign option contracts and increases its bargaining power in the upstream market. In a sense, option contracts allow us to observe, in greater detail, a strategic effect that is absent under forward contracts.
When there is uncertainty in the market demand of the final good, option contracts regarding subcontracting production may have the unintended consequence of increasing price manipulation in the downstream market. However, this effect could be avoided if buyers and sellers were able to sign long-term contracts or even if they integrated vertically. Hence, our findings extend the well-known result that vertical integration may serve to increase both the firms' profits and the consumer surplus, through the disappearance of double marginalization, which is replaced by a more general contracting set-up. This should be contrasted with the possibility that vertical integration leads to vertical foreclosure. Future research should try to disentangle the circumstances in which each of these countervailing effects is likely to dominate. 
Therefore the optimal number of option contract executed is either x=0 or x=X. 
which, according to (2), can be written as 
The derivative of these profits with respect of X,
which is strictly positive. Thus, profits with 0 > X are larger than profits given in (11) when no option contracts are signed. The optimal number of option contracts is then X * =m.  Proof of Lemma 3. In Region A, the option contract is exercised off the equilibrium path (if there is no agreement between the dominant firm and the input supplier and marginal costs of production are)
